Attitudes Towards the European Union in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

Did the Scots take into account Scotland's future in the EU when they went to the ballots?

ABSTRACT
Did the Scots consider Scotland's future EU membership when they went to the polls in the 2014 independence referendum? In this paper, I argue that conventional explanations of voting behaviour in the referendum have ignored a crucial aspect: the attitudes of the Scottish electorate towards EU membership. More precisely, I suggest that the European dimension was sufficiently politicised in the referendum campaign and, thus, in the voter's minds, too. I build on the theory of "EU issue voting". It states that – given a high amount of saliency of the EU question – people base their voting decision in national elections as well as in EU referendums on their attitudes towards the EU. To do so, I model both people's general attitudes towards EU membership as well as their subjective beliefs on the uncertainty of continued EU membership. My findings suggest that only if people had sufficient subjective certainty that Scotland would not lose EU membership they voted for independence. On the contrary, those who believed that Scotland cannot remain in the EU had a significantly less probability to cast their ballot for independence. This effect was especially pronounced for those voters who favour EU membership. Thereby, I extend the "EU issue voting" framework to a context where EU membership was not on the ballot but still affected by its outcome. Further, my results can help to predict the outcome of a possible second referendum.

Keywords: Scotland, independence, referendum, EU issue voting, EU membership, voting behaviour.

1 Introduction

Was the 2014 Scottish independence referendum also a referendum on Scotland's future in the European Union (EU)? During the campaign leading up to the referendum, supporters and opponents of independence argued about whether an independent Scotland could retain membership of the EU or would need to undertake a lengthy process of re-application. Hence, the European dimension can hardly be separated from the campaign (Keating 2017; Mitchell 2016). However, existing studies that investigate voting behaviour of the Scots in 2014 have persistently ignored to theorise an effect of Scots' attitudes towards EU membership on vote choice. What is more, they considered it – compared to other explanations such as economic variables – a negligible aspect throughout the referendum (Liñeira et al. 2017). At the same time, a "Yes" vote would have had severe consequences for EU membership (Keating 2017). Therefore, and given the closeness of the outcome, I want to offer another perspective on voting behaviour and argue that it is important to consider the Scots' attitudes towards the EU, too – especially as two years later, in the Brexit referendum, the Scottish electorate showed that a huge majority supports EU membership.[1]

Scholars have already established a theoretical framework that links attitudes towards the EU and voting behaviour. The causal mechanism states that voting behaviour in national arenas also depends on European considerations in a way that people review their preferences over how European integration should develop when they make their voting decision (Gabel 2000; De Vries/Tillman 2011; Garry et al. 2005). Research shows, for example, that attitudes towards the EU affect party choice in national elections and (dis)approval in EU referendums – a pattern termed "EU issue voting" (De Vries 2007; 2010). When theorising the effect of Scots' attitudes towards EU membership, I build on this mechanism. Thereby, I contribute to the existing literature in two ways: First, I complement conventional explanations of the 2014 voting behaviour with an approach that has largely been ignored by scholars. And second, I expand on the "EU issue voting" framework by arguing that it is unlikely to be only observable in national ballots. Rather, I suggest that it plays a role, too, in subnational contexts where the EU dimension was not the main focus but still politicised – such as the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. As a result, this could provide evi-

[1] In the 2016 Brexit referendum, 48% of the UK citizens voted to remain in the EU, while a majority of 52% voted to leave. In Scotland, in turn, 62% wanted to keep EU membership (BBC 2016).

dence that the EU dimension – given it is politicised or salient enough – brings about the potential to alter voting behaviour. Thus, the relevance of my topic reaches beyond the present case and persists in the insight that "EU issue voting" can also be a driving force in in other ballots and other settings than national elections or EU referendums. In particular, I argue that voters voted differently depending on how likely or unlikely they believed the scenario of Scotland retaining EU membership to be. Thereby, I model the uncertainty that centred on continued EU membership. To test the "EU issue voting" claim more explicitly, I simultaneously model Scots' attitudes towards EU membership. I expect the effect of uncertainty on the magnitude of change of voting behaviour to be significantly more pronounced for people who value EU membership. I test this claim using survey data from the Scottish Referendum Study (SRS). The results provide strong and robust evidence for my argument and suggest that the uncertainty centring on EU membership kept some people from voting "Yes". The findings, thus, reach beyond the 2014 referendum in a way that they can prove helpful in predicting the outcome of a possible second independence referendum – which is likely to be heavily centred on EU membership (BBC 2017a).

2 The referendum, EU membership and "EU issue voting"

The Scottish National Party (SNP), who had gained an overall majority in the Holyrood parliament in 2011, had promised an independence referendum for a long time (Mitchell 2016). In October 2012, the Scottish and the British government agreed that a referendum would be held on September 18th, 2014 (Mitchell 2016). Scots were asked to vote "Yes" or "No" on the question: "Should Scotland be an independent country?" Before the referendum, support for independence hovered at around 33% and opposition at around 52%, with the rest being undecided (Liñeira et al. 2017, 169). In the end, 55% voted "No", 45% voted "Yes" (Cairney 2015).

2.1 Voting behaviour in the Scottish independence referendum: State of the art

Both before and after the referendum, scholars were concerned with explaining why Scots vote the way they do. The most obvious approach concerned voters' national identity. Bond (2015, 5) argued that "people who identify as exclusively Scottish or at least prioritise Scottishness are much more likely to support independence (...) than are people who feel themselves to be equally Scottish and British, or have a prioritised or exclusive British identity".[2] Although he highlighted that in Scotland the relationship between national identity and constitutional preferences is not straightforward[3], scholars agreed that people feeling strongly Scottish systematically tended to vote "Yes" (e.g., Liñeira et al. 2017; Glen 2014). Based on descriptive analyses, Bond (2015), Glen (2014) and Henderson et al. (2015) found support for this relationship. Liñeira and Cetrà (2015) formulated this relation as an identity-driven distinctiveness of groups (see also Carey 2002 and Bond 2015). In other words, Scotland, by becoming independent, would regain all the political and economic powers from the Westminster Parliament – something that people with a strong, exclusive Scottish identity tend to favour (Henderson et al. 2015). Liñeira et al. (2017) found in a multivariate analysis that those feeling very Scottish to significantly tended to vote "Yes", those feeling very British to significantly vote "No".

Another prominent determinant of voting behaviour is economic inequality (ScotCen 2015). Glen (2014) noted that relative economic deprivation is part of Scottish nationalism. According to this approach, the more people of a region feel economi-

[2] This is measured using the so-called Moreno scale where people choose one of these options: "Scottish, not British", "More Scottish than British", "Equally Scottish and British", "More British than Scottish" or "British, not Scottish" (e.g., Moreno 2006).

[3] With 'constitutional preferences', the literature refers to people's beliefs of how their nation should be represented constitutionally. Examples include "independence outside of the EU", "independence within the EU", but also "no Scottish parliament". They do not all connect straightforwardly with national identification in the sense that being very nationalist does not automatically lead to full-fletched support for independence. Rather, for some this leads to support for more devolution to the Scottish parliament within the United Kingdom (Bond 2015).

cally disadvantaged vis-à-vis other parts of the UK, the more they tended to support independence (Henderson et al. 2015; Kopasker 2014). For Scotland, Henderson et al. (2015, 271) found that 44.2% of Scots – as a nation – felt "disadvantaged relative to England". The stronger this feeling – called "national interest" – for the Scottish respondents, the more they wished to see exclusively Scottish policies on different policy fields – something the "Yes" campaign promised for an independent Scottish government. They underline that national identity and national interest are independent determinants of constitutional preferences. Glen (2014, 15) delivers the theoretical underpinnings for this observation: "Economic inequalities" trigger "perceptions of exclusion and inclusion". This, in turn, can lead to exclusive sentiments. For the case of Scotland, Niedzwiedz and Kandlik-Eltanani (2014) found that people who thought economic inequality is too high in the UK tended to support independence. Curtice (2015) found that the percentage of "Yes" voters was highest amongst those Scots living in the most deprived neighbourhoods. Liñeira et al. (2017) found that, compared to people of the working class, middle class citizens were significantly less likely to back independence (see also Morisi 2016, Glen 2014 and Curtice 2015).

Relatedly, scholars found effects of age and gender. Curtice (2015, 6) found that younger people saw independence much more favourable than older people: While only 29% of those 65 and older supported independence, amongst those 25 to 34 years old the figure reached 59%. He concluded that older people were less keen to take the risk of independence. Liñeira et al. (2017) confirmed this finding, even when controlling for other factors. Another result was that women tended to vote "No" (Ormston 2014). Although scholars have not finally determined the reasons for this phenomenon (Curtice 2015), Ormston (2014) suggested that women were more uncertain about the future of an independent Scotland and the consequences of a break-up. Yet, this did only weakly explain the significant gender gap (Ormston 2014). In one of the first efforts to explain voting behaviour testing several variables simultaneously, Liñeira et al. (2017, 174) did not find any gender gap. Thus, findings concerning this variable remain ambivalent.

In their entirety, these theoretical and empirical approaches provide scholars with powerful predictors of voting behaviour (Liñeira et al. 2017). In fact, they mirror topics salient in the campaign (Mitchell 2016). Yet, I suggest that one factor determining the outcome of the referendum has largely been ignored by the literature: people's attitudes towards membership of the European Union and the related perceptions of uncertainty. Only Keating (2017) has extensively discussed the role of the issue in the referendum, but without any quantitative testing of it. Liñeira et al. (2017), who conducted one of the first multivariate analysis based on survey data, did not include this aspect. At the same time, scholars agree that it was at least part of the discussion of Scotland's future. What is more, in the 2016 Brexit referendum, a large majority of Scots showed that they hold strong attitudes towards the EU. Given the closeness of the referendum, I therefore find it crucial to not disregard this potential explanatory factor based on subjective assessments of its importance throughout the referendum campaign as Keating (2017) and Liñeira and colleagues (2017) did.

2.2 Scotland's referendum, the UK and the European Union

By focusing only on conventional explanations of voting behaviour, the existing literature ignored the EU issue when it came to explaining support for, or opposition to, independence. In this paper, I argue that precisely this aspect proves helpful to better understand people's choice. Before detailing why this is the case, it is crucial to understand the context of the 2014 independence referendum – what the salient topics were during the campaign and in voters' minds and in what political environment it took place.

First, within the UK, there is a powerful sense of regional identity, including in Scotland (Carey 2002). Frequently, large percentages of the electorates identify themselves as feeling strongly Scottish, or, on the Moreno scale, as "Scottish, not British" (Bond 2015; Liñeira/Cetrà 2015). According to Carey (2002), with the process of devolution in the end of the 1990s, these already clearly defined identities gained additional salience. Second, this strong feeling of Scottish nationalism is accompanied by lower levels of euroscepticism than elsewhere in the UK, especially if compared to the English electorate (Keating 2017; Simpkins 2015; Ormston 2015). In his analysis, Carey (2002, 406) finds a significant negative relationship between feeling English and supporting the EU. For Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, the relationship is significantly positive. In 2016, the British government held a referendum on EU membership ("Brexit"). Again, the different attitudes held across the UK towards the EU became evident. The result showed that the divide between EU supporters and opponents not only split the whole country (51.9% voted "leave", 48.1% voted "remain"), but also its regions: 62% of Scots voted "remain" (Cairney 2015).[4] This shows that within the UK there is significant disagreement on whether membership is beneficial or not, as compared to other European countries, and that this disagreement coincides with regional cleavages. But the EU issue reaches beyond regional identities – it is a highly politicised conflict in political debate and party competition of the UK for a long time now (Kriesi 2007; Bond 2015), where Scotland is found to be significantly more in favour of EU integration than other parts of the UK. I argue that this environment justifies the argument that the debate on EU membership during the campaign fell on fruitful soil.

The independence campaign[5] mostly centred on the highly uncertain consequences of independence (Liñeira et al. 2017). Many scholars agree that the most contentious issue was the economy (Liñeira et al. 2017; Mitchell 2016; Keating 2017). Liñeira et

[4] In Wales, there was a 52.5% majority in favour of leaving. In England 53.4% wanted to "leave", whereas in Northern Ireland 55.8% voted to "remain" (BBC 2016).

[5] The SNP campaigned for independence as well as the pro-independence movement *Yes Scotland*. The campaign of the "No" side was called *Better Together* and consisted mainly of a coalition of the Liberal Democrats, the Labour Party, and the Conservative Party (Mitchell 2016).

al. (2017, 176) state: “The Yes side underlined the benefits of an economic policy best suited to Scotland’s interests (. . .), while the No side insisted on the advantages of pooling risks (. . .) and not introducing any barriers to trade.” Also, the Scottish and the British government strongly disagreed as to whether an independent Scotland could keep the Pound and an affiliation with the UK’s Central Bank (Liñeira et al. 2017). Other contentious topics involved the removal of nuclear weapons stationed in Scotland, benefits from Scottish oil and issues of social welfare, such as pensions and health care (Mitchell 2016; Henderson et al. 2015). Both sides continuously highlighted the uncertainty of the other side’s proposals (Liñeira et al. 2017). In defiance of that, Bond (2015) and ScotCen (2015) found that the campaign helped to inform undecided voters’ choice in a sense that people’s national identities became more closely aligned with support for independence – and more people voted “Yes” (see also Morisi 2016).

In this paper, I focus on voters’ attitudes towards EU membership and how these affected voting behaviour. Indeed, the uncertainty of an independent Scotland’s future EU membership sparked discussions in the referendum campaign (Simpkins 2015; Keating 2017; Mitchell 2016). Mitchell (2017, 96) notes: “The European dimension recurred regularly throughout the referendum.” The SNP and the pro-independence campaign emphasised that an independent Scotland would continue to be a member of the EU, since it already was one as part of the UK. Unionists doubted that. A large part of the debate involved legal discussions, since there is no precedent of a European region seceding from a member state (Keating 2017, 102; Douglas-Scott 2016).[6] However, I do not argue on a legal basis, but rather emphasise the consequences of this uncertainty for individuals and their voting decision. As Keating (2017, 102) summarises: “The No side used doubts over EU membership to increase risk and uncertainty.” The debate gained additional weight in the campaign when, in January 2013 and thus only

[6]The “Yes” side argued for an “internal enlargement” using Article 48 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), while the “No” side argued Scotland would need to reapply using Article 49 TEU. For a more detailed legal discussion see Douglas-Scott (2016) and Simpkins (2015).

half a year after both governments agreed on the referendum, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced a UK-wide referendum on EU membership (Mitchell 2016). Subsequently, "the Yes side argued (...) that the greater risk was of Scotland being taken out of Europe against its own will in a future EU referendum" (Keating 2017, 102). The position of the Unionists was, however, prominently backed by leading EU figures such as José Manuel Barroso, the then president of the Commission (Keating 2017).

2.3 Attitudes towards European integration as independent variable

Now that I have identified the question of EU membership as one key issue at stake during the campaign, it is important to shed light on the relationship of these attitudes and people's voting behaviour. For a long time, scholars focused on the roots of EU support.[7] Later, they started thinking about the effects of these attitudes on political behaviour of European citizens in their domestic political arena – apart from European parliamentary elections. Matthew Gabel (2000, 55) was amongst the first to acknowledge that "there is good reason to expect voters to express their preferences over EU membership and European integration in their voting behaviour in national elections". Theoretically, this is especially to be expected for voters' party choice, since national political decisions regarding the speed or depth of European integration influence people's "welfare and political interests" (Gabel 2000, 55). In this framework, national elections serve as an opportunity to express these interests and to influence the prospects of European integration (De Vries 2010). Some scholars even argue that another cleavage over EU integration has emerged in national political systems, especially in the United Kingdom (Gabel 2000). Evans (1998), for example, showed that in the UK, voters' preferences over EU integration were largely independent from tradi-

[7] See Carey and Burton (2004), Carey (2002), Tillman (2004), Gabel and Whitten (1997), Hooghe and Marks (2005, 2008), and Franklin et al. (1994).

tional left-right positions (see also Gabel 2000). This observation further justifies my argument that "EU issue voting" can be expected in the UK – and thus also in Scotland. This kind of influence is termed "EU issue voting" (De Vries 2007, 2010). De Vries (2010, 92) defines it as "the process whereby individual preferences over European integration directly influence vote choices in national elections" – as opposed to indirect influences of EU attitudes via European parliamentary elections or via economic voting related to the interplay of the EU and national politics (e.g., Wilson/Hobolt 2014; Lobo/Lewis-Beck 2012).

Several scholars have tested the "EU issue voting" hypotheses created from this approach (De Vries 2010; Tillman 2004; De Vries/Tillman 2011). Based on survey data analyses, they can confirm that the theorised effect of "EU issue voting" holds independently of other known determinants of voting behaviour on the national level. Yet, this is obviously not the only approach to explain voting behaviour in a European Union realm. For EU referendums and European parliamentary elections scholars have developed the "second-order elections" framework (Reif/Schmitt 1980). It states, basically, that all elections other than the national ones – thus, also referendums – are "second-order" and are used by voters to punish or reward the current national government, mainly irrespective of those issues that are on the agenda in the "second order election" (Reif/Schmitt 1980; Van der Eijk et al. 1996). To be sure, this mechanism could be at work in the independence referendum as well. Garry et al. (2005), for example, found evidence that in the 2001 and 2002 Irish Nice Treaty referendums both elements of "second-order elections" and "EU issue voting" were at play. Yet, the evidence in favour of the "second-order election" effects was clearly weaker.

Building on this observation, I defend my approach by highlighting a second, more important aspect of "EU issue voting": the saliency of the EU issue in the electoral contexts. Hobolt (2005) found, based on survey data for the EU referendums held in

Denmark, Ireland and Norway, evidence for voting based on attitudes towards EU integration. The aspect which is especially important for my argument is that she found that the more intensive the referendum campaign, the more people rely on their EU attitudes (Hobolt 2005). Put differently, one cannot expect to observe "EU issue voting" *per se* in a given ballot. Rather, the EU dimension needs to be politicised. Many other scholars have found a conditioning effect of salience on the strength of EU issue voting, both for referendums and national election campaigns. De Vries (2007, 379) compared elections in Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and the UK between 1992 and 2002 and found that "the extent of EU issue voting is conditional upon the salience of the issue for voters and the extent of partisan conflict". The theoretical argument behind this finding holds that high disagreement between key political actors on European integration will spark attention of the topic in voters' minds, leading them to base their voting decision on their respective attitudes (De Vries 2007). Garry et al. (2005) showed similar effects of salience for their analyses on the 2001 and 2002 Nice Treaty referendums: the more vigorous the campaign, the more pronounced they found EU issue voting to be. Similarly, De Vries et al. (2011, 26) showed that "EU issue voting increases when media attention to and party conflict about the issue are high". Kriesi (2007) highlighted that the salience of the EU issue in national election campaigns varies across member states, and that it has been rising since the 1970s. It is highest in countries with widespread euroscepticism – such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Kriesi 2007). To highlight the contribution of this paper, it is important to underscore the weaknesses of this strand of literature. First and foremost, besides EU referendums and party choice (Gabel 2000; De Vries 2010), the framework has not been applied to other cases where European considerations should be equally likely to play a role. I posit that it is unlikely that voters only consider their EU attitudes when they go to national ballots. Rather, it is likely that these are also at work in voting situations where the outcome impacts the design, direction or speed of European integration. Testing this claim, I argue, can be achieved by analysing the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Another weakness is the literature's focus on euroscepticism (De Vries 2010; Kriesi 2007). Along with the scholarly acknowledgement of the fact that people have differing attitudes towards European integration (e.g., De Vries 2007), many studies focused on the rising influence of euroscepticism on voting behaviour, party systems etc. – famously termed "sleeping giant" hypothesis (Van der Eijk/Franklin 2004). Therefore, I explicitly turn this hypothesis upside down and investigate the theory in a context where there is a high share of europhilic sentiment. Since Scotland provides us with such a context (Carey 2002; Keating 2017; Ormston 2015), I argue that it is ideal to analogously establish the europhilic side of attitudes towards the EU.

Before developing my theory and hypotheses, I want to summarise the key aspects of the past section. First, I have highlighted that the research into voting behaviour of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum has neglected a factor potentially contributing to the closeness of the vote – namely attitudes towards membership in the EU. Second, I have underscored that this issue has traditionally been a highly politicised one across the UK, and especially that there is a divide between support and opposition across the regions – with Scotland being more europhilic. And, more importantly, the question of continued EU membership played a role throughout the referendum campaign. Third, I emphasised that the literature on "EU issue voting" has already established a separate relationship linking attitudes towards the EU and vote choice in national elections and referendums and that this is especially pronounced once the EU dimension is politicised. In a similar manner, I believe it to be at work in the Scottish independence referendum, too.

3 Theory & hypotheses: EU membership & the independence vote

Why should the Scots' attitudes towards EU membership[8] have influenced their decision concerning the independence of their country in line with the "EU issue voting" framework? The first part of my argument concentrates on the level of the UK context and the campaign. As has become evident in the previous section, the prerequisite for this is a sufficient amount of saliency of the EU issue and a highly politicised partisan conflict (Hobolt 2005; Kriesi 2007). I argue that effects of EU issue voting can reasonably be expected in the Scottish independence referendum because the context of UK politics provides a highly politicised cleavage that operates independently from traditional left-right politics – with the Scots being most europhilic (BBC 2016; Kriesi 2007; Bond 2015). Additionally, scholars agree that the level of general partisan conflict over issues of independence was very high – turnout in the referendum reached unprecedented 84.6% (Bond 2015; Morisi 2016; Simpkins 2015). To be sure, the conflict did not involve any opposition to EU membership. Rather, there was high partisan conflict over the *certainty* of continued EU membership. Therefore, scholars do not fully agree to which extent this issue was salient. Both Keating (2017) and Liñeira and colleagues (2017) argue that it was not as salient as, for example, economic questions. For Mitchell (2016), this is less clear, and Simpkins (2015) takes the issuing of a range of expert papers about legal questions on both sides as sign of relevance of the topic. Cairney (2015) highlights that there was considerable attention paid to Scotland's inclusion in the EU and the question of how the future Brexit referendum will turn out for Scotland's EU membership. In theory, this saliency, then, should have triggered "EU issue voting" by raising people's attention. Consequently, I argue that this perceived intensity of the

[8]While some of the "EU issue voting" literature (e.g., Tillman 2004, 591) uses the terms "EU membership" and "European integration" interchangeably, it is important to clarify that I do not. Rather, for extending the framework to the Scottish case I explicitly refer to their attitudes towards EU membership as a subcategory of attitudes towards "European integration".

EU issue during the campaign is not as important as how the issue influenced people's minds. I find it plausible that the *uncertainty* about EU membership made people reflect on the topic (Liñeira et al. 2017), and I thereby disagree with Keating (2017) and Mitchell (2016): Only because the parties on both sides supported EU membership, this does not mean the question was less important for voters, or did not influence their decision.

The second, more important part of my argument therefore focuses on the individual level of the Scottish voters. Descriptive survey data from Liñeira et al. (2017) show that for many people certainty on the EU issue would have had a significant impact on their voting decision. Around 28% of voters thought that Scotland would "likely" keep EU membership, while around 32% believed that it is likely that the UK will vote itself out of the EU in a future referendum. More importantly, people reported that it would be more likely that they voted "Yes" if (1) Scotland kept EU membership on the previous terms, as well as (2) if they knew the UK would vote itself out of the EU (Liñeira et al. 2017, 180). Also, 39% of respondents said they would have voted "Yes" if the EU "had made clear an independent Scotland would face no obstacles to become an EU member state" (Liñeira et al. 2017, 181), indicating that the uncertainty of being dragged out of the EU was one factor keeping them from voting "Yes". These results show that a significant part of the Scottish electorate (1) had their voting decision informed by their attitudes towards EU membership, and (2) another significant part of the electorate clearly supported membership – a fact that was re-established in the 2016 "Brexit" referendum. That suggests that some people would probably have changed their voting decision if they had certainty that EU membership would be maintained.

In sum, I argue that the prerequisite of saliency of the topic was given in both the campaign and, thus, also in voters' minds. But what kind of "EU issue voting" do I expect in the referendum? In the view of Gabel (2000), national elections serve as an opportunity to express the preferences that citizens hold regarding whether European integration is good or bad, or whether the process should be faster or slower, or going in a different direction. The reason for this is that it crucially affects their "welfare and political interest" (Gabel 2000, 55). Since people want to see their preferences to be implemented, they try to influence the prospects of EU integration through voting (De Vries 2010). Put differently, according to this theoretical mechanism people also reflect on the consequences of their voting decision for their preferences on EU integration and vote for the option that best represents these.[9] In national elections, people thus also tend to vote for the party whose ideological position on EU integration is closest to theirs (Downs 1957; Hobolt 2006, 2007). For example, if a voter sees EU integration critically, she might vote for a party that will try to prevent more powers to be handed over to the EU, or try to avoid new countries to join, or even demand leaving the EU. The same mechanism is at work when it comes to EU referendums. Here, people vote for the option that is closest to their ideological ideal point on the policy spectrum, too (Downs 1957; Hobolt 2005). Implicit in this argument is the question: Why should people wait for elections to the European Parliament to express their preferences if other current – national or subnational – ballots are likely to affect the prospects of EU integration, too?

For the Scottish case, this means that people recognise the referendum's consequences and take these into account when making their decision. In the previous sections, I have outlined that I find that the literature has too long ignored approaches to voting behaviour other than the classical ones, although they potentially help to better understand the 2014 independence referendum. Based on the theoretical mechanism of "EU issue voting", I therefore extend the framework to the context of the independence referendum. In other words, I suggest that the 2014 independence referendum

[9] This argument holds similarly for other policy fields, for example for domestic policies (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2008).

– for some people – already was a referendum on EU membership. I do so because people's decision would directly influence the implementation of their preferences on EU membership (Keating 2017). I believe that, confronted with finding a decision on whether to vote "Yes" or "No", voters would therefore think about these options' consequences for EU membership. These consequences are crucially influenced by the different level of uncertainty that directly translates to the two options on the ballot: From the time the campaign started up until ballot day, there was never any legal certainty if an independent Scotland could stay member of the EU or would need to undergo an uncertain process of re-application (Simpkins 2015; Douglas-Scott 2016).

Hence, the key factor that needs to be modelled is the uncertainty about the future EU membership of an independent Scotland, since the referendum was no explicit ballot on membership. This way, I can gauge whether people in 2014 cared about EU membership and had their voting decision informed in an "EU issue voting" fashion. I expect the uncertainty to crucially influence people's voting behaviour, just as it is the case with other factors such as the uncertainty about a Currency Union with the UK. Liñeira et al. (2017) found, for example, that if the UK government had allowed Scotland to keep the Pound, more people would have voted "Yes". The evidence concerning EU membership is similar: Many respondents said they would tend to vote "Yes" if they had certainty that Scotland would keep its EU membership (Liñeira et al. 2017). Also, some scholars noted that the high uncertainty played to the advantage of the "No" side (Keating 2017, 114; Morisi 2016; Liñeira et al. 2017). In an experimental setting, Morisi (2016) found that, depending on the individual economic perceptions, people react differently to the perceived risk of choices. In the referendum he identified the "Yes" option as the risky choice (see also Liñeira et al. 2017), as opposed to voting "No", which supported the *Status quo*.[10] I apply this logic analogously to EU membership and argue that only if people feel sufficiently certain that EU membership can be maintained, they are willing to vote for the risky option. At the same time, this consideration reflects an implicit expression of the preferences that people hold on EU membership. Given that a large majority of Scots prefer to remain in the EU (BBC 2016), I expect that the greater they perceived the threat to EU membership, the more people would have voted "No" and in favour of the *Status quo*. In other words, only if people had *subjective* certainty – as opposed to *objective*, legal certainty – they were significantly more likely to vote "Yes", since then they did not see EU membership in jeopardy. The null hypothesis in this case would signify that Scots did not care about the prospects of EU membership – then, the uncertainty of EU membership should have had no effect at all on vote choice. From this, I derive my first hypothesis:

H1a: *The more voters think it is likely that an independent Scotland can stay in the EU, the more likely they are to vote "Yes".*

In this argument, both voting "Yes" and "No" can be seen as an expression of support for the EU, depending on whether people believe an independent Scotland can stay in the EU. If one believes it can stay, it is not irrational to vote "Yes" if one supports the EU. If one does not believe Scotland will stay, voting "No" would help to ensure continued membership as part of the UK. Yet, these assertions only hold for europhilic voters, and I cannot assume that critics of the EU would behave similarly. I therefore need to additionally model whether people support or oppose EU membership to fully grasp people's fear, or unwillingness of leaving the EU. Thus, the effect

[10] Note that a few days before the referendum, the Better Together campaign – in accordance with Prime Minister David Cameron – promised devolving further legislative competences to the Scottish parliament if a majority would vote to remain (Mitchell 2016; Cairney 2015). To some extent, this linked the option of "further devolution" (previously refused to be put on the ballot by PM Cameron's government) to voting "No". Though, due to the very little time between the announcement and the referendum, gauging the effects of this action is beyond the scope of this paper.

of hypothesis H1a should be significantly more pronounced for people who support EU membership, since Scotland undergoing a lengthy process of re-application with unknown result would significantly harm their EU preferences. For people opposing membership this should be less of an issue.[11] This leads to my second, conditional hypothesis:

H1b: *The more voters think it is likely that an independent Scotland can stay in the EU, the more likely they are to vote "Yes". This effect is more pronounced for people who value EU membership than for those opposing EU membership.*

4 Data & variables

4.1 Data

To analyse the impact of the uncertainty of continued EU membership on vote choice in the independence referendum, I use survey data from the Scottish Referendum Study (SRS), which was conducted online by YouGov.[12] It consists of three panel waves, the first one being conducted during the last four weeks before the referendum, the second one immediately after the referendum and the third one a year after. Around 4,800 respondents participated. The face-validity of the data regarding vote intention and support for EU membership is high. The aggregate figures correspond closely to the outcome of the independence referendum as well as the outcome of the Brexit

[11] I do not formulate explicit predictions for people opposing EU membership. This category involves strong, Brexit-favouring unionists and strong independentists who both wish no (new) attachment to the EU – these are difficult to distinguish in terms of my analyses.

[12] The data are not yet freely available on the internet, but they have been made available to me by professor Rob Johns from the University of Essex, one of the study's co-investigators. I am very grateful for that.

referendum (see also appendix A for descriptive statistics).[13]

4.2 *Dependent variable*

My dependent variable reflecting Scots' vote choice is coded binarily, with 1 denoting a "Yes" vote and 0 denoting a "No" vote. The data contain both the reported vote intention and recalled voting decision. I am aware that both items suffer from usual survey problems such as social desirability effects or, in the case of post-ballot surveys, bandwagon effects (e.g., Van der Meer et al. 2015). Since my theory does not favour any of the two, I use the vote intention because most items I need as independent variables have only been asked in the first wave. Furthermore, Morisi (2016) found in an experimental study conducted as a panel both before and after the Scottish independence referendum that the vote intention that participants reported matched their recalled voting decision very well. The fact that both the SRS pre- and post-ballot items match almost perfectly with the actual outcome shows that there has been no significant over- or underreporting. Due to the binary nature of my dependent variable I later estimate logistic regression models.

4.3 *Independent variables*

My main independent variable is an ordinal scale that captures the respondents' answer on the question: "If Scotland becomes independent, how likely do you think it is that Scotland would be able to retain membership of the EU on similar terms?" Respondents answered on a five-point scale: "Very likely", "likely", "neither likely nor unlikely", "unlikely", "very unlikely". Values range from 1 to 5, where the highest values indicate "very likely". This way, I can capture the individual's beliefs about her

[13] In the pre-referendum wave, 52.6% wanted to vote "No", 47% wanted to vote "Yes". In the post-referendum wave, 53% said they voted "No", 47% said they voted "Yes". The actual outcome was 55% "No", 45% "Yes". In the data, 69.5% of respondents favour EU membership, compared to 62% voting remain in 2016 (BBC 2016; see also descriptive data in appendix A, table A.2).

uncertainty about what happens to EU membership. In order to distinguish EU opponents and supporters, I use the question: "Thinking about the European Union, do you think membership in the EU is generally a good thing or a bad thing?" People could answer "Generally a good thing" or "generally a bad thing" (see, e.g., Carey 2002). I code the former as 1, the latter as 0.

4.4 Control variables

To be certain that my independent variables yield an independent effect, I need to test them against other factors from which scholars have established that they influenced voting behaviour in the referendum. I will do so by introducing various control variables that reflect these approaches that I have reviewed in the second section. The question wording, scale coding and corresponding descriptive statistics for each can be found in appendix A. First, I include the respondents' *Age* (table A.5) and *Gender* (table A.3). Second, I control for people's national identification. Here, I use the Moreno scale I have introduced earlier (table A.9, *National ID*). Other controls involve economic questions: Since scholars argue that the Pound has been the most contentious issue (e.g., Liñeira et al. 2017), I include a question capturing people's beliefs on the future of the Currency Union (table A.6, *Cannot Keep Pound*). To reflect both the "national interest" as well as the individual economic situation, I include two more controls. One focuses on the national level and is concerned with whether people believe Scotland gets its fair share of government spending or not (table A.8, *Scotland Fair Share*). Another question reflects personal economic consequences of independence (table A.4, *Better Off Independence*).[14] Lastly, I control for people's party identification with Scottish parties (table A.7, *PID*), since people in referendums sometimes tend to vote for

[14]For the sake of simplicity, I treat all independent and control variables that are categorical as continuous (except for *PID*). However, one could argue that the differences between the categories of the Moreno scale are not equally sized, which is why I repeated my regression models with this variable as categorical variable. My results did not change substantially. The same holds for treating all other variables as categorical.

the proposal that the party they identify with favours (LeDuc 2003; Liñeira et al. 2017).

5 Results

Results from multivariate logistic regression analyses with vote intention as dependent variable are shown in table 1. Was the referendum for some a referendum on EU membership? I have argued that given the saliency of the question of continued membership during the campaign and the high amount of partisan conflict – a prerequisite to expect ”EU issue voting” in other ballots – people would consider the consequences of their vote for their preferences on continued EU membership. The reason for this is that the outcome of the referendum crucially affects the future of the integration of Scotland in the European Union. To test this claim, model 1 first includes my two main explanatory variables concerning the European Union, without controls and interaction effect. Here, only the certainty of future EU membership (*certainty*) seems to matter in a sense that if one thinks that Scotland can retain membership of the EU one is more likely to vote “Yes”. This already displays evidence in favour of hypothesis H1a. Favouring EU membership (*EU good*) itself does not have any effect. Model 2 adds all control variables to model 1.[15] The effect of *certainty* does not change, but now the *EU good* variable becomes slightly statistically significant in a sense that those supporting EU membership also tend to vote “Yes”. To understand my results more easily, figure 1a shows predicted probabilities based on a reduced model 2.[16] With the subjective belief of the likelihood of Scotland retaining EU membership on similar terms increasing, the probability of voting “Yes” increases sharply. People who think that continued

[15]Note that for models that include the *PID* control, the sample size decreases sharply. This is because in the whole sample only a random half of respondents were asked about their party identification.

[16]For the simulation of figure 1 I excluded the *PID* variable and the *EU good* variable, all other variables are held at mean or mode. Excluding the two variables makes plotting easier, since I would need to choose a value for every covariate. This means that I could only plot predicted probabilities for people who support or oppose EU membership and who have a certain PID. By excluding them I can show the effect for all respondents. I am able to do so because my effect of *certainty* is robust against the inclusion of *PID* and *EU good*.

EU membership is "very unlikely" have a predicted probability of voting for independence of around 10%, while those who think this is "very likely" have one of around 80%. Even those who think it is "neither likely nor unlikely" vote "Yes" with a predicted probability of around 45%. The fact that this pattern emerges so clearly even when I control for the variables that the literature describes as being crucial for vote choice provides robust evidence for hypothesis H1a.

Model 3 introduces the interaction term between *certainty of EU membership* and *EU good*. I thereby test hypothesis H1b. However, it is difficult to interpret the three coefficients of the interaction as they are presented in the table (see Brambor et al. 2006). I therefore simulated predicted probabilities to visualise the effect stated in hypothesis H1b. Figure 1b shows predicted probabilities based on model 4. Note that compared to model 3 the effect of my interaction term holds robustly even if I remove the PID variable in order to make plotting predicted probabilities easier, showing that both effects are independent. Figure 2 displays probabilities for two different groups of people: those who value and those who oppose EU membership. In line with hypothesis H1b, the graph shows that for the former the effect of *certainty* is significantly different: if those supporting membership think that continued membership is "very unlikely", they have a predicted probability to vote "Yes" of around 11%, while those thinking it is "generally bad" have one of roughly 22%. This becomes clearer looking at the values of 4 and 5 on the x-axis ("likely" and "very likely"). Those not valuing membership only have a probability to vote "Yes" of less than 60%, those who value membership reach a probability of more than 80%. Only in the middle ("neither likely nor unlikely") and the "unlikely" category there is no difference in predicted probabilities for the two groups. Substantively, this means that people who value EU membership are much stronger affected by the uncertainty that centred on EU membership – because they have more to lose. There is, however, one thing that comes as a surprise in figure

Table 1: Explaining Voting Behaviour in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum

	(1) Model	(2) Model	(3) Model	(4) Model
EU Good	.001	.46*	−1.26^{+}	−1.40**
	(.10)	(.23)	(.67)	(.45)
Certainty EU Membership	1.59***	.82***	.44**	.39***
	(.05)	(.10)	(.17)	(.11)
EU Good x Cert. EU memb.			.56**	.59***
			(.21)	(.14)
Age		−.004	−.005	−.01
		(.01)	(.01)	(.004)
Gender (Female)		−.60**	−.59**	−.51***
		(.21)	(.21)	(.14)
National ID		.71***	.70***	.94***
		(.10)	(.10)	(.07)
Cannot Keep Pound		−.69***	−.72***	−.81***
		(.11)	(.11)	(.08)
Better Off Independence		.99***	.97***	1.14***
		(.13)	(.13)	(.08)
Scotland Fair Share		.57***	.57***	.66***
		(.12)	(.12)	(.08)
PID: Other/UKIP		−.49	−.55	
		(1.04)	(1.02)	
PID: Labour		−.55*	−.54*	
		(.25)	(.25)	
PID: Conservatives		−1.39^{+}	−1.37^{+}	
		(.72)	(.73)	
PID: Liberal Dem.		−.23	−.27	
		(.68)	(.68)	
PID: SNP		1.72***	1.70***	
		(.32)	(.32)	
PID: Greens		1.64**	1.66**	
		(.63)	(.64)	
Intercept	−5.02***	−8.01***	−6.73***	−7.89***
	(.16)	(.88)	(.97)	(.67)
Observations	3,943	1,791	1,791	3,569
Log Likelihood	−1,488.50	−340.40	−336.83	−707.55
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,983.00	710.81	705.66	1,435.10

Note: Coefficients are logit coefficients from logistic regression.
Dependent variable is reported referendum vote intention (Yes = 1).
Baseline category for PID is 'No PID'.
Significance levels: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

1b: People who think EU membership "generally" is a bad thing have a significantly higher predicted probability to vote "Yes" once one changes from "very unlikely" to "very likely" on the x-axis. Since I had no explicit expectation for this group, I can only speculate about the reasons for this. For example, one could plausibly expect a downward-trending slope. The reason I do not find such a slope might be that the group of EU opponents still see some advantages in EU membership so that they are willing to keep it – after all, they only "generally" think it is bad. Another explanation could be that this group includes strong anti-Unionists that care more about leaving the UK than about future EU membership.

Figure 1: Simulation of Predicted Probabilities Based on Reduced Model 3 & Model 4



(a) Note: All other variables held constant at mean or mode. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The varying variable on the x-axis ranges from 1 - ”very unlikely” to 5 - ”very likely”.



(b) Note: All other variables held constant at mean or mode. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The varying variable on the x-axis ranges from 1 - ”very unlikely” to 5 %- ”very likely”.

To assess the quality of the models in terms of fitting the variation of my dependent variable I first consider the AIC provided for models 1 to 4 in table 1. The full model 3 including the interaction term clearly performs best across my models, suggesting that this is the model with the smallest residual error.[17] Also, comparing the values to model 2 of table B.1 in appendix B, which only includes control variables, shows that the addition of my main independent variables provides a significant improvement compared to conventional approaches of explaining voting behaviour. Further, I have computed a likelihood ratio test between the "controls only" model of table B.1 in appendix B. It shows that model 3 performs best among the models. To further ensure the robustness of my models, I have used recalled vote decision as an alternative dependent variable.[18] Additionally, I randomly dropped half of the observations. My results did not change substantively in both cases, pointing to the robustness of my effect.

In sum, based on my analyses, I can confirm both hypotheses. These findings stand in stark contrast to what the literature has carved out as being important determinants of voting behaviour in 2014 (e.g., Liñeira et al. 2017). To be sure, those variables that scholars have deemed important prove to be significant in all my models. However, the ignorance of the European dimension of the independence referendum – both regarding the campaign and the consequences for an independent Scotland – proves even more unjustified. My findings show that the Scottish electorate did care about EU membership back in the independence referendum – not only marginally. Their subjective belief of whether Scotland could have stayed in the EU or not did crucially affect their voting decision.

More importantly, these findings lend support for my argument that EU issue voting can also emerge in domestic and subnational areas in which it is found to be politi-

[17] The same holds for the BIC, which introduces a penalty for additional parameters.

[18] Although there was only little time between the two waves, given that my variables have not been asked in the post-referendum wave I have to assume that people's attitudes were stable.

cised. Here, it can bring about the same potential to alter voting behaviour just as it does in national ballots or EU referendums. As reflected in my independent variable capturing *certainty of EU membership*, people's beliefs about the prospects of Scotland's EU integration influence their decisions. My findings show that this can be the case in other ballots on the national or even subnational level, since these possibly also have an impact on how EU integration (or EU membership) will look like in the future. Yet, for EU issue voting it is more important to look at figure 1b: People who value EU membership are – compared to those not valuing membership – significantly less likely to vote "Yes" once they think continued membership is very unlikely. However, once they thought it is likely or very likely, they were significantly more likely to vote "Yes". Put differently, I find that Scots would almost not vote "Yes" if they had a strong subjective belief that Scotland will lose its membership – especially those who value being part of the EU. I therefore interpret the Scots' behaviour as another variation of EU issue voting. This finding relates to the general europhilic nature of the Scottish electorate – a fact that later also surfaced in the 2016 Brexit referendum. Not only did their attitudes towards EU membership influence their voting decision, it did so clearly in favour of EU membership. This additionally complements the literature on EU issue voting in a way that it puts a focus on europhilic instead of eurosceptic attitudes.

Lastly, my results fit neatly with other findings on the effect of uncertainty on Scots' voting behaviour. Morisi (2016) found that people who were affected by the uncertainty surrounding independence tended to choose the "secure" option of voting for the Status quo, while those who were less so tended to vote for independence. This seems to hold for the uncertainty on continued EU membership as well, since uncertain people tended to vote "No", while those people who had subjective certainty rather voted "Yes". I thereby also confirm the findings of Liñeira et al. (2017) on the relationship between uncertainty and the two options on the ballot. In fact, my findings show that the uncertainty that related to the future of EU membership clearly seems to have kept people from voting "Yes". Given the closeness of the referendum result, this means that if there had been certainty on the issue in favour of continued EU membership, this might have contributed to a swing of the result in favour of independence.

6 Summary

In this paper, I have argued that the 2014 Scottish independence referendum for some Scots also was a referendum on EU membership. The underlying assumption is that its outcome would have had severe consequences for the prospects of Scotland's integration in the European Union. I have therefore argued that people considered these consequences when making their choice and thus had their voting behaviour – in an "EU issue voting" fashion (e.g., De Vries 2007; De Vries et al. 2011) – informed by these consequences. Doing so, I complemented existing explanations of voting behaviour in the referendum.

I have found that people's subjective perceptions of what is likely to happen to Scotland's EU membership after independence did in fact influence their voting behaviour. Those who believed that continued membership was very unlikely had a very low probability to vote "Yes", while those who thought it is very likely had a very high probability to do so. This finding displayed Scots' unwillingness to leave the EU. Further, I find that this effect was even stronger for people who value EU membership. From these findings, I conclude two things: (1) existing literature has readily – and, as I have shown, in an unjustified manner – ignored the European dimension of the referendum. This holds for people's voting behaviour as well as for the campaign. And (2), "EU issue voting" can also be a driving force of voting behaviour in contexts other than national elections or EU referendums. In the Scottish case, the question of EU membership was sufficiently politicised and – just as the literature predicts (e.g., Hobolt 2005; Garry et al. 2005) – influenced people's behaviour.

Yet, with respect to the context of the campaign my analysis shows some shortcomings. First, I do not explicitly model campaign effects. Doing so would reach beyond the scope of this paper and should be a focus of further research to add to the validity of my results. Especially the fact that both sides tried to increase or decrease uncertainty deserves more scholarly attention. For example, did the "No" side succeed in rising uncertainty for those who think it is unlikely that EU membership will continue? After all, a referendum under such uncertain conditions is a rare case. This leads to another issue concerning my analysis: Due to the uncertainty, I was not able to directly assess the effect of attitudes towards the EU without including a measure for uncertainty. Researchers might try to test my claim in a less uncertain context. And, lastly, I have not included a direct test of the saliency dimension that I use for the justification of my argument. Rather, I have argued based on indirect evidence of Liñeira et al. (2017) that the EU dimension affected voters' attitudes. Future research on the Scottish independence referendum should therefore put more emphasis on the campaign's salient topics.

Nonetheless, my results can be generalised to a possible second Scottish independence referendum (Ormston 2015). Especially after the UK voted to leave the EU, the SNP considers calling a second one – with the single purpose of enhancing Scotland's prospects of staying in the European Union (BBC 2017a). Given the UK government agrees to hold this referendum, my results can help to predict voting behaviour more accurately. If those people highly endorsing EU membership were kept from voting "Yes" in 2014 because they believed continued membership to be unlikely, they might – after Brexit – be more inclined to vote "Yes" in the second referendum in order to maximise chances to keep membership. What is more, these explanations extend to the europhilic yet secessionist movements in other regions in Europe, such as the independence movement in Catalonia or the Basque country (BBC 2017b). In Catalonia, for example, nationalists are seeking independence from Spain – yet, they do not seek independence from the European Union. Rather, they explicitly want the newly independent country to be part of the European Union (Guirao 2016). Here, a similar relationship between attitudes towards EU membership and vote intention might be at work.

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A Appendix: Descriptive Statistics

Table A.1: Dependent variable(s) *Vote Intention* and *Vote Recall*.

Statistic / Variable	*Vote Intention*	*Vote Recall*
Total Observations	4,471	2,472
”Yes” (1)	2,101 (46.99%)	1,166 (47.17%)
”No” (0)	2,370 (53.01%)	1,306 (52.83%)

Table A.2: Variable *EU good*: “Thinking about the European Union,
do you think membership in the EU is generally a good thing or a bad thing?”

Total N	**”Good” (1)**	**”Bad” (0)**
4,223	2,935 (69.5%)	1,288 (30.5%)

Table A.3: Variable *Gender*: Female = 1, Male = 0

Total N	**”Female” (1)**	**”Male” (0)**
4,849	2,583 (53.3%)	2,266 (46.7%)

Table A.4: Variables *Certainty EU membership* (“If Scotland becomes independent, how likely do you think it is that Scotland would be able to retain membership of the EU on similar terms?”) and *Better Off Independence* (“If Scotland becomes independent, how likely do you think it is that I personally will be better off?”)

Statistic / Variable	*Certainty EU Membership*	*Better Off Independence*
Total Observations	4,849	4,849
Mean if continuous	2.99	2.64
Std. Dev. if continuous	1.37	1.17
Very unlikely (1)	890 (18.35%)	973 (20.07%)
Unlikely (2)	1,068 (22.03%)	1,212 (24.99%)
Neither likely nor unlikely (3)	899 (18.54%)	1,643 (33.88%)
Likely (4)	1,164 (24.00%)	634 (13.07%)
Very likely (5)	828 (17.08%)	387 (7.98%)

Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics of variable *Age*.

Number of Obs.	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**
4,849	49.39	16.06	16	88

Table A.6: Variable *Cannot Keep Pound*: "If Scotland becomes independent, how likely do you think it is that Scotland would keep using the Pound?"

Statistic	**Value**
Total Observations	4,849
Mean if continuous	2.58
Std. Dev. if continuous	1.33
Very unlikely (5)	543 (11.20%)
Unlikely (4)	796 (16.42%)
Neither likely nor unlikely (3)	832 (17.16%)
Likely (2)	1,430 (29.49%)
Very likely (1)	1,248 (25.74 %)

Table A.7: Variable *PID*: "Thinking now about Scottish politics at Holyrood, do you usually think of yourself as being a supporter of one particular party or not?" If yes: "Which party is that?" Note that only a random half of the sample was asked to answer this question.

Party	**N of Obs.**	**Percentage**
No party ID	1,104	45.04
Others/UKIP	30	1.22
Labour	487	19.87
Conservatives	152	6.20
Lib. Dem.	48	1.96
SNP	574	23.42
Greens	56	2.28
Total Obs.	2,451	100

Table A.8: Variable *Scotland Fair Share*: “Would you say [Scotland] gets more or less of its fair share of the UK government spending?”

Statistic	Value
Total Observations	4,586
Mean if continuous	3.36
Std. Dev. if continuous	1.11
”... much more than its fair share” (1)	184 (4.01%)
”... a little more than its fair share” (2)	889 (19.39%)
”... more or less its fair share” (3)	1,455 (31.73%)
”... a little less than its fair share” (4)	1,203 (26.23%)
”... much less than its fair share” (5)	855 (18.64%)

Table A.9: Variable *National ID*: “Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?”

Statistic	Value
Total Observations	4,510
Mean if continuous	3.53
Std. Dev. if continuous	1.2
”British, not Scottish” (1)	403 (8.94%)
”More British than Scottish” (2)	325 (7.21%)
”Equally Scottish and British” (3)	1,379 (30.58%)
”More Scottish than British (4)	1,252 (27.76%)
”Scottish, not British” (5)	1,151 (25.52%)

B Appendix: Robustness & model superiority

Table B.1: Establishing Robustness and Model Superiority.

	Full Model 3	Controls Only
EU Good	-1.26^{+}	
	(.67)	
Certainty EU Membership	$.44^{**}$	
	(.17)	
EU Good x Cert. EU memb.	$.56^{**}$	
	(.21)	
Age	$-.005$	$-.01^{+}$
	(.01)	(.01)
Gender (Female)	$-.59^{**}$	$-.60^{**}$
	(.21)	(.19)
National ID	$.70^{***}$	$.86^{***}$
	(.10)	(.09)
Cannot Keep Pound	$-.72^{***}$	-1.05^{***}
	(.11)	(.10)
Better Off Independence	$.97^{***}$	1.29^{***}
	(.13)	(.11)
Scotland Fair Share	$.57^{***}$	$.65^{***}$
	(.12)	(.10)
PID: Other/UKIP	$-.55$	$-.88$
	(1.02)	(.97)
PID: Labour	$-.54^{*}$	$-.43^{+}$
	(.25)	(.22)
PID: Conservatives	-1.37^{+}	-1.33^{*}
	(.73)	(.65)
PID: Liberal Dem.	$-.27$	$-.30$
	(.68)	(.62)
PID: SNP	1.70^{***}	1.75^{***}
	(.32)	(.29)
PID: Greens	1.66^{**}	1.79^{**}
	(.64)	(.58)
Intercept	-6.73^{***}	-5.63^{***}
	(.97)	(.68)
N	1,791	2,021
Log Likelihood	−336.83	−414.79
AIC	705.66	855.58

Significance levels: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.